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SITUATIONS VACANT, on next page

ELLINGTON-STREET, STRAND, W.C.

all, and that the doctrine of *Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subeunt* should be allowed its full swing.

THE DOCTRINE OF REMOTENESS AND THE ALABAMA CLAIMS.

A STRONG feeling exists in this country concerning the extent of the claims put forward in the American "Case" for arbitration, embracing as they do losses indirectly caused, or supposed to have been caused, by the negligence of our Government in permitting ships destined to operate as Confederate cruisers, to escape from ports in Great Britain. No doubt the arbitrators will be governed by the somewhat loose rules of international law, and what those rules are we discuss in another column; but assuredly the common law doctrine, recognised alike in the United States and in this country ought to prevail, that damages not proximately caused by the act complained of, are not recoverable. Damage not within the rule as to remoteness, must be the natural consequence of the act committed by the defendant.

The instance in which this rule most frequently arises is in actions of slander, the leading case being that of *Vicars v. Wilcocks* (2 Sm. L. Cas. 461), the head note running thus: Where special damage is necessary to sustain an action for slander, it is not sufficient to prove a mere wrongful act of a third person induced by the slander, such as that he dismissed the plaintiff from his employ before the end of the term for which they had contracted; but the special damage must be a legal and natural consequence of the slander. To this is added the elementary doctrine—Damage, to be actionable, must not be too remote—a doctrine which dates from early times, being noted in Comyns's Digest.

The damage alleged in the American case includes loss by the prolongation of the war, and the transfer of the American marine to the British flag. Were any court of law or equity, would any jury, ever be convinced on the evidence admissible by the Americans, that these damages were the natural and proximate result of the negligence of the British Government? We are responsible for the actual damage done by the cruisers which we allowed to escape, that is, for vessels captured and property destroyed by them. An analogous case may be found in *Fletcher v. Rylands* (L. Rep. 3 E. & L. App. 320), where the doctrine we have stated is applied to a reservoir, flooded the plaintiff's mine. In the Exchequer Chamber, Mr. Justice BLACKBURN laid down the law as to the liability of persons who have dangerous elements on their land, which seems to us to be on all fours with the facts in the *Alabama* case. "We think," said his Lordship, "that the true rule of law is that the person who, by his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so is *prima facie* answerable for all the damage which the natural consequences of its escape. . . . The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour's reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour's privy . . . is damnable without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour who has brought something on his own property (which was not naturally there), harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should, at his peril, keep it there, so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences."

The natural and anticipated consequences of the escape of the water in that case were the flooding of the mine and the stopping of the works—that is to say, the result which immediately and necessarily happened. Applying this view to the case of the cruisers, the proximate damage was, as we have said, the loss of the property and amount of property. It is not because said the destruction of the mine, beyond that the damage becomes too remote and irrecoverable. Supposing in the illustrations put forward by Mr. Justice BLACKBURN in *Fletcher v. Rylands*, a plaintiff whose grass had been trodden down or whose corn had been eaten, claimed, among his damages, the loss of cattle which had been killed by such grass and corn, he certainly could not recover—the damage would be too remote.

It is not because an event does happen as a consequence of a particular act that such event will ground a claim for compensation, as *Ashley v. Harrison* (1 Esp. 48) shows. There the defendant published a libel on Madame MARA, in consequence of which she refused to sing (as she had engaged to do) at the plaintiff's oratorio, from an apprehension of being hissed and ill-treated, whereby the plaintiff lost the benefit of her services. Lord KENTON held that the action was not maintainable.

From a purely legal point of view, therefore, the claim put forward in the case to damages for prolongation of the war and incidental expenses, is wholly unjustifiable. It ought to be utterly untenable before a council of international arbitration.

EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES.

REG. v. PAYNE.

By the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in *Reg. v. Payne*, it may be now considered settled law that co-defendants, when on their actual trial, are incompetent to testify for or against each other. On this question there has been a great conflict of professional opinion. On the one hand it has been argued with great plausibility (see for example, Taylor on Evidence 1178-80, 5th ed.) that the 2nd and 3rd sections of Lord Campbell's Act (14 & 15 Vict. c. 99) read together, forcibly, if not necessarily, implied that, in a criminal proceeding, persons who were accused on a joint indictment were rendered competent and compellable as witnesses, each in favour of or against the others. In the case of *Reg. v. Deely and others* (11 Cox C. C. 607) where three persons who had been jointly indicted were being tried together for felony, Mr. Justice Mellor taking this view of the Imperial law, two of the prisoners to be called as witnesses on the behalf of the third. On the other hand, it was said that the Act was not intended to effect any alteration whatever in the law of evidence as applicable to criminal cases. The question was considered to be and really is of such importance, that when in the case of *Reg. v. Payne* the precise point which had been reserved by Mr. Justice Keating, viz., "Whether a prisoner jointly indicted with another, can, after they have been given in charge to the jury, be called as a witness for the other without the parties to the trial being convicted or a *autre poeint* entered," came on last week for decision, no less than sixteen judges sat to assist in determining it. The unanimous judgment of the court, delivered by the Lord Chief Justice shows that the evidence is not admissible—that the old law remains unaltered, that the reference to criminal proceedings in the 3rd section of the Act is a provision, the only *ex majore cautela*, and that a party on his trial can neither be examined nor cross-examined.

To the argument that a prosecutor eager to obtain a conviction might intentionally include several alleged offenders in a joint indictment, in order to exclude each of them from testifying in favour of the others, the Lord Chief Justice replied that in such a case the Judge could obviate this by ordering them to be tried separately, when there was reasonable ground to think that a joint trial would operate as an abuse of justice.

To our minds this discretionary power vested in the Judge, and which, we presume, in minor cases must also be vested in magistrates, is scarcely a sufficient safeguard. As a matter of right, each of several persons before being put on his trial on a joint indictment, ought to be at liberty to demand a trial distinct from that of those accused with him, in order that he may, if he think fit, avail himself of their evidence. There can be little doubt that the existence of accomplices or participants in a crime, operates in favour of the accused. We, however, can see no reason why a person charged jointly with others should not be asked before being put on his trial whether he wishes to be tried separately, being informed at the same time, that if he so elects, the others will be competent and compellable witnesses in his favour or against him, and that he in his turn will be a competent and compellable witness against or in favour of the others.

MR. JUSTICE LAWSON'S REFORMS.

COPIATION has received a new advocate in Mr. Justice LAWSON, but in the paper which he has read before the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, that learned judge has not confined himself to this one subject. He shows himself in the van of law reformers on more than one important point. He would admit hearsay evidence; he would disqualify no person whatever as a witness "by reason of his being a party or having any interest in the suit, or for any other reason." The provision which he would introduce into his code on the law of evidence is this:—"Any person who in any criminal proceedings is charged with the commission of an indictable offence, or any offence punishable by summary conviction, shall be competent, but not compellable, to give evidence for himself, and if examined shall be subject to cross-examination as any other witness."

This, it is anticipated, will provoke considerable opposition. We consider that there is a fatal objection to it. The prisoner who holds his tongue would be self-condemned. It is no doubt deplorable that counsel should consequently have the opportunity of appealing to juries on the score of the prisoner's mouth being shut; but to place him in the invidious position suggested, would be as cruel to him as the other course is unfair to the law. We have a difficulty in seeing any possible middle way between closing the mouths of prisoners and rendering them liable to examination, and we decidedly consider that the latter plan is the more advisable. A point on which we heartily agree with Mr. Justice LAWSON is, the expediency of the previous conviction of prisoners being made known to a jury. We have recently fully expressed our views on this head, and the fact that Mr. Justice WILLES considers that such information should not be withheld from a jury ought to secure a change in the law.

We do not propose at present to accept Mr. Justice LAWSON'S

invitation to enter upon a full discussion of his specimen code on the law of evidence. We have very clear notions of our own as to what a code ought to be and, looking cursorily at the one before us, we are not inclined to approve of the form which it takes. It comprises forty principles, stated without classification or index. The German and French codes to a great extent adopt this plan, but we do not consider that it will do as applied to the great bulk of English law. A specimen of any particular branch of law should be upon the same method as that upon which codification generally must proceed, and we readily see the fact that, in all its example referred to by the learned Judge, that, namely, of contracts, it would never do to classify them simply as verbal and written. We should find ourselves in a wilderness of principles and exceptions, and if we are to have a general index at the end of the work, we might as well content ourselves with our text books.

But as to the matter—what should a code be? "The true office of a code," says Mr. Justice LAWSON, "is to put in writing such parts of the unwritten law as are deserving of being preserved in our jurisprudence, omitting those which are trivial or ephemeral, and abolishing those which are faulty." There is a preliminary difficulty here. Who is to be the judge? Who is to say what is deserving and what not?—what is faulty and what not? Our view is that the law should be codified with the fact that, in all its most trivial details, and then let Parliament consider what shall be retained and what amended. Certainly, to begin with, we must leave nothing out, for a defective code would be worse than a comprehensive chaos. The view of the Digest Commissioners doubtless was that a digest would necessarily precede a code. The writer has had some practical experience in codifying, and it is our opinion that no one can successfully compile a code who has not first made a digest. Mr. Justice LAWSON acknowledges the value of our case law; it is beyond dispute a mine of wealth from which clearly cut principles are to be extracted. No case ought to be relegated to the limbo of forgotten things until it has been carefully examined by a competent person. Whether that person should be a text-book writer is doubtful, and here we consider that the Digest Commissioners fell into a very natural error. The highest skill in the practical application of cases should be employed in digesting and codifying our English law. A dozen men of the calibre and experience of Mr. Justice LAWSON would do the work well, but until Government and the country recognise the necessity for disregarding expense and employing the highest available talent a code will not be satisfactorily accomplished.

THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SURETIES.

A CASE was heard before the Lord Chancellor in December, which we report to-day, bearing out our view of the rights of sureties where time is given to the principal. In some cases it has been contended that although there be an express contract by the creditor to give time to the principal debtor, the surety ought not to be released until he can prove that by being held to his engagement he suffers some actual damage. We have had our say to the contrary, and the highest Judge in the kingdom agreeing with us, we transcribe his judgement, which in our opinion expresses the true ground upon which the liability of a surety must rest.

Lord Hatherley recognised the original principle to be this: "That if you contract with the principal to give him time, it is contrary to that contract that you should sue the surety, because if you do you immediately turn the surety upon the principal, who is at liberty to sue him, and therefore your act breaks the engagement into which you have entered with the principal." Then his Lordship proceeds, "It is not simply neglecting to sue the principal which would have any effect upon the surety, but there must be a positive contract with the principal that you will postpone the suing of him to a subsequent period. To show that this is the principle we have only to refer to another class of authorities which until recently clearly and distinctly establish that it is competent to the creditor, if he thinks fit, to reserve all his rights against the surety, in which case the surety is not discharged, and for this reason the contract then made with the principal is preserved, because they have engaged with the principal that they will not sue him for a given time, but subject to the proviso that they shall be at liberty to sue the surety and turn the surety upon him, and that that shall be no breach of the engagement. That, I may say, has been recognised up to a late period, because, although Lord Truro threw some doubts upon it in the case of *Owen v. Homan*; when the case came before the House of Lords the Lord Chancellor—I think Lord Cranworth—in giving judgment, said, there could be no doubt about the case before the House, and he did not think he should have entered into any discussion of the case himself had it not been for the doubts thrown by Lord Truro upon that principle, namely, that you might release the surety if that formed part of the original contract as to not suing the principal, and he said a doubt having been thrown out he thought it right to protest against the doubt, because he thought it was a doctrine perfectly clear and established."

This judgment was given reversing a decision of Vice-Chancellor Malins in the case before, who held that the surety was not discharged (see *Oriental Financial Corporation v. Overend*,

Gurney and Co., 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 774), but a leading authority, being a decision of the House of Lords, was not cited before the Vice-Chancellor; namely, *Oakley v. Padley* (1 Cl. & Fin. 307). In that case, as described by the Lord Chancellor, an ordinary case of principal and surety, a banker owed 10,000l. to the creditors of Sir Charles Oakley. They borrowed it for the purposes of the bank. One of the partners who so borrowed the money died, and a bond was given by his executors for the payment of the money. At the time the bond was given, Sir Charles Oakley did not know the names of those giving the bond as principals, but at the time of giving the bond they were principals, and nothing else, and were liable with their co-partners. These co-partners of the deceased partner found there that the testator's estate was burdened as principal with this debt, or at all events as between himself and the surety. But subsequently to that an arrangement was entered into between the bank and the executors of the deceased partner, by which the bank, for a sum paid to the executors, bought all his share and interest in the concern, and undertook to pay all his debts and liabilities on behalf of the concern. From that moment, of course, and only from that moment, the executors who gave the bond originally as principal debtors to the creditor became as between themselves and the remaining partners of the bank simply sureties for the debt. They being such sureties, Sir Charles Oakley, in possession of the House to have had district notices of that character in the hands of the solicitor held by Sir John Leach in the court below, and by the House of Lords in the court above, to have discharged the executors of the deceased partner who originally gave the bond to his creditors, and who had originally been the principal debtor.

These cases can leave no doubt as to what is the present law on a subject most important to a commercial community basing nearly all its transactions upon credit.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ARBITRATION.—III.

IT must not be forgotten that the QUEEN'S Proclamation was issued till after news had been received in Great Britain of the blockade. Lord Russell's dispatch to the Emperor of Russia on the 15th, reached this country on the 29th, and that of the 15th, establishing a blockade of all the ports save those in Virginia and North Carolina, on 15th May, more than a week before the date of the QUEEN'S Proclamation.

We will now proceed to consider the liabilities, if any, incurred by Great Britain during the war, taking first those, if any, arising from the sale, burning, or equipping of English subjects, or of ships of the Confederates of ships of war or trade, and, secondly, those, if any, caused by undue hospitality shown subsequently by the Government or its officials to Confederate vessels when visiting our ports at home or abroad.

The first vessel built in England for warlike purposes which passed into the hands of the Southerners was the *Florida*. She was laid down in the Mersey expressly for the Indian Government, and left Liverpool as the *Oreto*, in March 1862, for Palermo. Before her departure, on account of Mr. ADAMS's belief that her real destination was the Confederate service, an inquiry was instituted, but the examiners were satisfied that Mr. ADAMS was mistaken. Having put in at Nassau, she was there seized, but was released, the Judge of the Admiralty Court ruling that evidence of acts done outside his jurisdiction was inadmissible—a decision which is now considered to be erroneous. From Nassau she ran the blockade into Mobile, remained there four months and was completely equipped, and then a second time passed through the blockading squadron. If these two escapes were not willfully assisted by the Northern commanders, there must have been on their part such a degree of inattention to their duty as to differ but little from collusion, and such as would, on a plea of contributory negligence, go far towards relieving this country from responsibility.

Very shortly afterwards, on the 28th June, Mr. ADAMS gave information of another war ship, nearly completed in the Mersey, and apparently intended for the same purpose as the *Oreto*. On the 4th July, an answer was returned from the Customs asking for further information, which was sent in on the 10th, and supplemented by depositions on oath on the 21st. From the 22nd to the 26th, these documents were in the hands of the QUEEN'S ADVOCATE, warnings that the vessel was about to sail being meantime addressed to the Customs authorities and to Lord RUSSELL. A delay of three more days occurred from the ill-health of the QUEEN'S ADVOCATE, and on the 29th the Government were advised that the vessel ought to be detained. She had, however, from timely information received by her owners, that morning put to sea. She went to Tarentum, received her stores and assumed the name of the *Alabama*, and commenced her destructive career. The *Georgia* sailed from Greenock on the 2nd April 1863, without armament or crew, which were brought to her when at sea from Liverpool. The first notification that reached the Foreign office in respect of her was from Mr. ADAMS on the 8th April. The *Sea King* was a common merchant vessel which had been employed in the China trade; she was in the Gulf of Mexico on an ordinary voyage; put in at Funchal for her war stores, &c.,

pose of compensating the officers of the former company, might be administered under the direction of the court, and also paying for an inquiry who were entitled to share in the fund. On the 24th Jan. 1871, Stuart, V.C., made a decree in the suit ordering the Great Eastern Railway Company to pay the fund into court, and directing that the plaintiff was entitled to share in it, and directing an inquiry what other persons were entitled to share in it, and in what proportions. One Ayres, who was formerly the solicitor for the Eastern Union Railway Company, was not made a party to the suit, and was not served with the decree, but on advertisements being issued for persons claiming to share in the fund to come in and prove their claims, Ayres made a claim, and asserted that Bruff was not entitled to any part of the fund. Finding that he could not raise this contention, as the decree made in the suit contained a declaration that Bruff was entitled to share in the fund, he wished to present a petition of re-hearing, but he found that he could not present such a petition as the decree had been already enrolled. Accordingly he now moved that the enrolment of the decree might be vacated in order that he might be in a position to present his petition of re-hearing.

Greene, Q.C. and Bird, in support of the motion. Kewdale, Q.C. and Lockhart, for the plaintiff. Senior, for the Great Eastern Railway Company.

Lord Justice JAMES was of opinion that the application was right both in substance and in form. Ayres being entitled to share in the fund which the court had undertaken to distribute in the suit, was a quasi party to it. That being so he had a right to apply for the enrolment of the decree to be vacated, but he was prevented from doing so by the fact that the decree was enrolled. The applicant was therefore entitled to have the enrolment vacated, so that he might proceed with his petition of re-hearing.

Lord Justice MELLISH concurred.
Solicitors for the applicant, Benham and Tindall.

Solicitor for the plaintiff, G. Walker.
Solicitor for the company, W. H. Shaw.

Jan. 25, and 27.

*Ex parte HAWKES; Re KEELY.
Bill of sale—Last assent—Decision of
Bankruptcy.*

THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy affirming the decision of the registrar of the County Court of Cornwall. Hawkes, on the 7th July 1871, obtained judgment against Keely for 49*l.* 10*s.* 9*d.*, and on the 11th he sold Keely's goods and effects to the value of 15*l.* Keely executed a bill of sale of his household furniture, goods, chattels, and effects at Fornaury and elsewhere in the County of Cornwall, to secure a sum of 200*l.* due to his bankers. On the 16th Sept. 1871, Keely was adjudicated bankrupt. On an application by the bankers the registrar of the County Court of Cornwall made an order that Hawkes, the judgment creditor, from selling the goods which he had seized on the ground that Keely, by executing the bill of sale before the seizure of the goods, had committed an act of bankruptcy. It appeared that the bill of sale did not comprise all the bankrupt's property, as he had an East Indian man servant of 10*l.* 6*d.* a day, which was not assigned by the bill of sale, and on that and certain other grounds, Hawkes appealed to the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, who affirmed the registrar's decision. He now appealed from the order of the Chief Judge.

*Key, Q.C. and Bailey, for the appellant.
De Gier, Q.C. and Robertson Griffiths, for the respondents.*

Lord Justice MELLISH said that the bill of sale substantially comprised all the debtor's property, as it was settled in *Gibson v. The East India Company* (5 Bing. N. C. 362), that such a pension as that held by the bankrupt is not assignable. The bill of sale was therefore an act of bankruptcy.

Lord Justice JAMES concurred.
Appeal accordingly dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellants, Clark, Woodcock, and Aylmuts.
Solicitors for the respondent, J. Elliott Fox.

Jan. 23, 24, and 27.

THE MAYOR OF LONDON v. SANDON; THE SAME v. THE METROPOLITAN RAILWAY COMPANY; THE METROPOLITAN RAILWAY COMPANY v. THE MAYOR OF LONDON.

Contract—Specific performance—Latent ambiguity—Fused evidence—Juries—Acquiescence.
THESE were three appeals from decisions of the Master of the Rolls. The first suit was instituted to restrain Messrs. Sandon from selling or leasing most certain shops erected by them on a piece of land on the north side of Charterhouse-street, which the Metropolitan Railway Company agreed to let to them, and to restrain the company from granting a lease of the land in question to them

without a covenant by the lessees not to use the houses erected for the sale of meat. The two other suits were for specific performance of an agreement dated the 1st July 1869, and made between the corporation and the company, by which it was provided, amongst other things, that the company should not let certain land for building without inserting in the leases covenants against the use of the houses to be erected thereon for the sale of meat. The question was whether this agreement extended to the piece of land agreed to be let to Messrs. Sandon. The Master of the Rolls admitted that the agreement was a covenant, and held that it did not extend to the piece of land in question. The corporation appealed.

*Sir Richard Baggeley, Q.C., Swenson, Q.C., and E. Miller, Q.C., for the corporation.
The Solicitor-General (Jessel, Q.C.), Sir Russell Palmer, Q.C., and Fellows, for the company.
Southgate, Q.C. and E. Rodwell for Messrs. Sandon.*

Lord Justice JAMES said that there was no latent ambiguity in the agreement, and that parol evidence was therefore not admissible. The agreement, according to its true construction, extended to the land in question. But as the corporation knew, in Sept. 1869, that Messrs. Sandon were building butchers' shops on the land, and took no steps to prevent their doing so till Jan. 1870, when they had expended a considerable sum in erecting buildings, they had been guilty of the clearest laches and acquiescence, and could not now enforce the restrictive covenant against Messrs. Sandon or against the railway company, who had *bona fide* believed that the agreement did not extend to the land in question. On those grounds the appeal must be dismissed with costs as against the Messrs. Sandon, but without costs as to the other parties.

Lord Justice MELLISH concurred.
Solicitors, Durlcheil, Nelson.

Wednesday, Jan. 31.

(Before the LORDS JUSTICES.)

Re THE NATIONAL ASSURANCE AND INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION.

Practice—Appeal—Limit of amount.

THIS was an appeal from an order of the Master of the Rolls. In Nov. 1861 Charles Henry Edmunds acted as solicitor for one Cross, in proving a claim for 1600*l.* in the winding-up of the above company. Edmunds also acted as solicitor for one of the other claimants against the company. On the 24th June 1864, the chief clerk of the Master of the Rolls decreed that the costs should be allowed as the costs of proof in the case of each admitted claim for a sum exceeding 10*l.*, the costs in each case to be added to the debt. The creditors received two dividends: two divided to the sum of 1*l.* 15*s.* to Edmunds. Cross being about to receive a sum of 5*l.* 5*s.* in respect of a third dividend, Edmunds, in Aug. last, took out a writ against the Master of the Rolls, praying for a declaration that he had a lien for the 1*l.* 15*s.* on the dividend payable to Cross, and that the official manager might be ordered to pay that amount to Edmunds out of the sum payable to Cross. The Master of the Rolls having refused the application, Edmunds appealed from his decision.

*Fry, Q.C. and Caldecott, for Edmunds.
Robbings, Q.C. and Goringier, for the official manager.*

Lord Justice JAMES—Unless I am otherwise ordered, by the House of Lords or some other competent court, I will not hear an appeal for a sum of 35*s.*

Solicitors: Edmunds and Mayhew.

ROLLS COURT.

Jan. 20 and 29.

Re HASELFOOT'S ESTATE (CHAMBLIN'S CLAIM).
 mortgage and representatives of mortgagee—Right to take—Set-off.

A FIRM of solicitors having a mortgage on a policy of insurance on the life of the mortgagee, on his death received from the insurance company the amount due on the policy, and after satisfying the mortgage debt, claimed to be entitled to retain the balance of the amount of their bill of costs out of the balance. The executors of the mortgagee contended that they were entitled to receive the whole of the balance, and that the firm was insolvent to pay his debts in full that the mortgagee could only participate with the other simple contract creditors, *pro rata*, in regard to the amount due to them for costs.

Southgate, Q.C. for the mortgagees.

Hemming for the executors.
LORD ROMILLY said that the mortgagees were entitled to retain the amount due to them for costs out of the balance in their hands; that it was not a case of set-off, but a demand against themselves, they having in their hands a part of the testator's

estate, and not a demand against the testator's estate in the hands of some other person, law.
Solicitors: Chamblin, Crouch, and Spencer; Lucas and Coe.

V. C. MALINS'S COURT.

Saturday, Jan. 27.

Re GARNIER.

*Fund in court to credit of one found to be lunatic in France—Application for payment by provisional committee of estate—Practice of court. PETITION for payment out of court of 186*l.* 0*s.* 0*d.*, which represented the distributive share of Charles Garnier in the estate of his brother, Francis Garnier, who died intestate in 1863. The fund was paid into court in 1864, and was placed in a *maison de santé* at Neuilly-sur-Seine, where he still remained. He had not yet been found a lunatic according to English law. In 1861 a provisional committee of the estate of the lunatic was appointed by the civil tribunal of first instance at Versailles, and the petitioner was the present committee, covering the period to time of the lunatic; and, on the other hand, all the property of the lunatic was vested in him, and he was empowered to give valid receipts for the same. There was considerable personal property in England belonging to the lunatic, the dividends on an account of the maintenance of the lunatic. There was no allegation that the lunatic was in need of any further comfort, and it was stated that the application for the payment out of the fund in court was made in order that the same might be invested in French Rentes.*

*Gosse, Q.C. and Begg, for the petitioner.
Cotton, Q.C. and Goringier, for the administratrix, opposed the application.*

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR said there was no doubt that the committee had vested in him the whole property of the lunatic, and was entitled to make the present application. But the question arose whether the court had any discretion to exercise in the matter of the payment out of the fund to an English lunatic, the practice of the court having jurisdiction in lunacy was not to pay out the whole fund to the committee, but to make such an order as to the maintenance of the lunatic. Under the Trustee Relief Act the court had the same discretion as the Lord Chancellor exercised in lunacy. He could not order the payment out of the fund of the expenses properly incurred by the petitioner on account of the lunatic, and of the costs of the petition. The balance of the fund was to remain in court, and the dividends paid to the petitioner.

Solicitors: G. and P. Eyre and Co.; T. J. Horwood.

V. C. BACON'S COURT.

Jan. 19, 23, and 27.

ANDERSON v. ANDERSON.

Will—Wife of testator attesting witness—Effect of codicil confirming will.

HANNAH ANDERSON, by her will dated the 10th Dec. 1868, after revoking all former wills and making certain specific bequests, devised and bequeathed all the rest and residue of her estate and effects unto and to the use of her son, George Anderson, and Henry Lettis, upon trust to sell and convert the same into money, and to divide among her five younger children, among them being her son George, but not making any disposition in favour of, or mentioning the name of, the plaintiff, who was her eldest son. To this will Hannah Anderson, the wife of the testator's son George, was an attesting witness. The testatrix made a codicil to her will dated the 22nd Jan. 1869, by which, after directing her executors to allow to her son, Thomas an extended time for the payment of what might be owing from her estate, she also "confirmed her said will in other respects." This codicil was duly executed in the presence of two witnesses. Probate of the will and codicil was granted to George Anderson as executor. The plaintiff, by his bill alleged that in consequence of Hannah Anderson being an attesting witness of the will, all such interest as George Anderson would have taken under the will was forfeited, and that the testatrix must be held to have died intestate as to so much of her estate as George Anderson would have taken, and according to the tenor of the will, if his wife had not been one of the attesting witnesses. The defendant, George Anderson, contended that the will and codicil together formed one testamentary instrument, and that the codicil having been duly executed and attested, had the effect of reducing the gift in the will valid.

distinct jurisdictions, every matter, act, charge, or complaint by which the jurisdiction thereof are affected, or in which they have any interest, shall, for the purpose of jurisdiction, be deemed to arise or exist equally throughout the Kingdom.

Matthews, Q.C. and Jeff, for the respondents, showed cause.

Powell, Q.C. and Bosanquet, for the appellants, supported the rule.

The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.), considered that the Legislature, by sect. 27 of the Act of 1857, must have intended that the appellants' jurisdiction in cases of orders of removal should be the same as that under which the orders were originally made; and that in consequence, this appeal ought to have been brought before the Wolverhampton borough sessions, and not before the Stafford county sessions.

Rule discharged.

Attorneys for appellants, S. W. Johnson, for Brooke, Robinson, and Co., Dudley.
Attorneys for respondents, Neal and Philpot, for H. Langman, Wolverhampton.

Saturday, Jan. 27.

Re MARY ANN TURNER.

Habeas Corpus—Mother's right over children—Pecuniary guardianship.

Day moved for a writ of *habeas corpus* to bring up the body of Mary Ann Turner, aged about thirteen, who is at present in a Protestant refuge, for her homeless children. The motion was made on behalf of the child's mother, who is now dying of consumption at the Marylebone workhouse. The father, who was a Protestant, died when the child was about two years old; the mother had the child baptised according to her own religion, that of a Roman Catholic. The mother had been an habitual drunkard except during the time she had spent in different workhouses. In July last, a district visitor, having found that the child was neglected and starved, sent her, with the mother's consent, to the institution which she now is in. After five months, the mother alleged, by affidavit, that she desired to remove the child from Protestant influence, and to have her brought up in her own religion, an opportunity having been found to place her in a Roman Catholic institution. Brannwell, B., at chambers, had refused the application.

The COURT (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.), considered that, under the circumstances, they were not bound to interfere by writ of *habeas corpus*. Attorneys for applicant, Tucker, New, and Langdale.

Jan. 27 and 29.

THE JUSTICES OF LANCAHIRE v. THE LORDS OF THE TREASURY.

Mandamus—Cost of prosecutions—Statutory obligation of Lords of the Treasury—29 & 30 Vict. c. 39—34 & 35 Vict. c. 83.

Manisty, Q.C., had obtained a *rule nisi* on behalf of the justices of Lancashire, calling upon the Lords of the Treasury to show cause why a writ of *mandamus* should not issue to compel them to pay certain costs of prosecutions which had been paid by the treasurer of the county of Lancaster upon indictment.

The Appropriation Act (34 & 35 Vict. c. 89) contains a grant, not more than a certain sum, for criminal prosecutions. The Exchequer Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 39), compels the treasurer to receive and bring in to pay out of the funds at their command certain costs for prosecutions, as taxed by the officers of assize. The assize orders provide that the costs formerly payable out of the county and borough rates be paid by the Treasury. The costs, concerning which this application was made, had been accordingly paid by the treasurer of the county of Lancaster; and the board of examiners, appointed by resolution of the House of Commons for that purpose, re-estimated them and a considerable reduction had been claimed by the said treasurer from the amount handed over by the Lords of the Treasury.

The Solicitor-General, Brabant, and Archibald, for the Lords of the Treasury, showed cause, and contended that a *mandamus* could not be granted on the grounds, first, that the Lords of the Treasury were servants of the Crown; secondly, that the Acts of Parliament merely limited the purposes to which the particular sums granted should be appropriated, and did not lay any statutory obligation upon the Treasury to pay these sums; and, thirdly, that the Legislature intended the Treasury officers to exercise a discretion in the manner and amount of payment.

Manisty, Q.C. and Gort, for the Justices of Lancashire, supported the rule, and relied upon the words of the Acts referred to as imposing an obligation which gave the justices authority to exercise its mandatory jurisdiction.

The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush, JJ.), although they considered that the Lords of the Treasury ought to pay the whole of the costs claimed, considered there was no

duty imposed by statute which could be enforced by *mandamus*.

Rule discharged.

Attorneys for plaintiffs, *Ridale and Graddock, for Birchall, Wilson, and Hulton, Preston.*
Attorney for defendants, the Solicitor to the Treasury.

THE JUSTICES OF THE WEST RIDING OF YORKSHIRE v. THE LORDS OF THE TREASURY.

This was a similar rule to the last, for the same purpose. The parties were represented by the same counsel, and the cases were argued and decided together.

Attorney for plaintiffs, G. Badham, for Marsden, Wakefield.

Attorney for defendants, the Solicitor to the Treasury.

Tuesday, Jan. 30.

REG. C. JUSTICES OF SURREY AND OTHERS.
Division of a highway—Widening of old road—Consent of owner—Certiorari.

This was a rule obtained for a *certiorari* to bring up orders made and documents deposited in regard to a division of a highway. The enrolment of the certificate had been opposed at quarter sessions under the provisions of the Highways Act 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 59), s. 88, but it was found that notice of appeal to the surveyor had not been given in proper time, and the persons who considered themselves aggrieved now attempted to set aside the order of sessions as being bad on the face of it, and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the justices. The objections were (1) that the alleged new highway was merely a widening of an old road; (2) that the consent of the owner was not stated in the certificate of justices; (3) that the force of consent differed from that given in the schedule, and was bad because the persons given it were described "as, and claiming to be owners of the land adjoining," and because the substituted road to which the consent referred was described as "through or adjoining our said land."

Field, Q.C. and Thorpe for the respondents, the managers of the Metropolitan Asylum, near Catterham, who had diverted the road, showed cause.

Deaman, Q.C. and Clarke, for the appellants, supported the rule.

The COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Mellor and Lush, J.J.), considered that the preliminary formalities of the 84th and 85th sections had been substantially complied with.

Rule discharged.

Attorneys for appellants, Horne and Nicholson.
Attorneys for respondents, Nicholson and Herbert.

Wednesday, Jan. 31.

RE AN ATTORNEY.

Attachment—Attorney—Abolition of imprisonment for debt.

P. O. Crump moved for a rule for an attachment against an attorney for non-payment of a sum of money ordered to be paid by an order of a master which had been made a rule of court. The application had been refused on the previous day, on the ground that a *fi. fa.* might issue on the rule. A further affidavit was now produced, which stated that the sheriff had already served writs against the attorney, and must return *nulla bona*, therefore the rule for attachment was again moved.

The COURT (Blackburn and Preston, JJ.) said that an attachment would not be granted, especially on the last day of term, for non-payment of money, now that imprisonment for debt was abolished by the Act of 1869. The court being drawn to the fact that an attorney might still be imprisoned under the Debtors' Act for non-payment of money, the COURT said that the rule would leave the applicant to his remedy on a *ca. sa.*

Attorneys, Few and Co.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

Tuesday, Jan. 30.

Ex parte KING AND WIFE; Re P. AND W.

(Attorneys.)

Affidavit—Omission of "addition" of deponent—Irregularity—Waiver.

This was a rule to show cause why P. and W., attorneys, should not be made liable to costs, on a writ of *certiorari* on which the rule was moved omitted to state the "addition" of the deponent.

Prideaux, Q.C. for P., and

Lopes, Q.C. for W., showed cause against the rule.

Prideaux objected that no "addition" or "mys-tery" being given, the affidavit was irregular and the rule ought to be quashed.

Q.C. desired, on behalf of his client W., to waive the irregularity and be allowed to show cause.

The COURT (Willes, Byles, Brett, and Grove, JJ.), held, on the authority of *Cobbett v. Oldfield* (16 M. & W. 400), that the omission of the said

quashing the rule; but, further, that it was an irregularity only, and might be waived. So far, therefore, as it affected the rule, it would be quashed, but with regard to W. it would stand, and Mr. Lopes would be allowed to show cause.

Attorney for King, G. Parsons.

Attorney for W., J. P. Walford, Bristol.

BYRNE & GRANO CONSIGNMENT COMPANY.

Freight—Jurisdiction of Mayor's Court.

ACTION for freight on a charter-party brought in the Mayor's Court of the City of London. Rule for a prohibition to restrain the jurisdiction of the Mayor's court: it did not arise within the jurisdiction. The voyage was from the China Islands to the Southampton Docks.

Cohen showed cause, and contended, first, that freight was due in respect of delivery only, and not for carriage; secondly, that by custom such actions were within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's court: (*Mayor of London v. Cox*, L. Rep. 2 H. L. 238).

Shivers (Will for the defendants).

The COURT (Willes, Byles, Brett, and Grove, JJ.) held, first, that the whole cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction; and, secondly, such a custom could not give an inferior court jurisdiction beyond its local limits.

Rule absolute.

Attorneys for the plaintiff, Flus, Argyle, and Rawlins, 1, East India Avenue.

Attorneys for the defendants, H. P. Sharp.

Wednesday, Jan. 31.

RICHARDS v. GELLATLY AND OTHERS.

Practice—Inspection.

Murphy moved to vary an order of Cleasby, B., at chambers, which directed the inspection of certain documents and letters in the custody of the defendants, "except letters of other passengers, and letters of captains and owners submitted to the 21st Dec. without prejudice to application to the court in respect of letters of other passengers." The motion was to vary the order by striking out the words in inverted commas. The action was brought on a promise that a certain ship was in a fit state, &c., whereby plaintiff was induced to become a passenger on the same, and afterwards, owing to the bad state of the ship, was obliged to disembark on the 21st Dec. (the day mentioned in the order), and lost the benefit of the money he had paid for the passage. The second count was for fraudulent misrepresentation as to the state of the ship, whereby, &c. The plaintiff had interrogated the defendants, and their answers admitted that they had received a number of letters subsequently to Dec. 21, from passengers in the ship (other than the plaintiff), and from the captain and owners of the ship. It was alleged that other passengers besides the plaintiff had been compelled to leave the ship owing to its unfitness, and that defendants had received letters from the owners, and also from the captain, &c., which they had not shown to the plaintiff. The defendants also represented themselves as being merely the agents of the owners, and it was suggested that the letters from the owners would show truly what was the relation between the ship and the defendants.

The COURT (Willes, Byles, Brett and Grove, JJ.) refused the rule.

Attorneys for plaintiff, Eyre & Co.

June 23, 24, 1871, and Jan. 31, 1872.

NORTH-EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY (app's) v. RICHARDSON AND ANOTHER (resp's).

Railways—Drops—Common carriers—Bailees for hire—Liability.

This was an appeal from the decision of the County Court judge for Westmoreland. The respondents (plaintiffs below) were carriers of goods, and the appellants (bailees for hire) were carriers of goods. The appellants carried the goods to a station on the defendants' line for the purpose of being conveyed by the railway. The fare was paid, but no ticket was given, and no special contract entered into. The dog was given in charge of the guard of the train and conveyed some distance on its journey. It was taken then out and kept near a station, until some other train came up. While at the station it was fastened to a pump, but, getting frightened, it managed to slip its collar and ran away down the line, where it got over by a train. In a conspicuous part of the station a notice was posted up stating that the collector was not authorised to enter into contracts for the carriage of dogs except in a particular way, which had not been followed here. The County Court judge gave judgment against the company, damages 50s., and this was an appeal against that decision.

June 23 and 24—*Shield* for the appellants.

Kemp for the respondents.

Curr. aud. vult.

Jan. 31—Willes, J. gave the judgment of the court (Willes, Keating, and M. Smith, JJ.) in favour of the appellants, on the ground that the dog was carried in a manner contrary to the regulations of the railway company, and that under the circumstances they were nothing more than bailees for hire, so as to be

liable only in the event of negligence, of which there was no evidence.

Judgment for the appellants without costs.
Attorneys for appellants, *Hutchinson and Lucas, Darlington.*
Attorneys for respondents, *Kynaston and Gasquet.*

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.

May 22, 1871 and Jan. 22, 1872.

HUBSON v. WALKER.

Landlord and tenant—Order of County Court—Delivery of possession—County Court Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 108), ss. 50, 51—Trespass—Justification of under the Act—Parties to suit—Estoppel.

THIS was an action of trespass which was tried before Martin, B. and a special jury at the last spring assizes for the county of Cumberland, 1871. The facts were shortly these: The defendant who claimed to be the landlord of a person named Usher in respect of the premises in question, an outhouse or shed attached to and belonging to a public-house called the Red Lion, at Grassmoor, had sometime previously issued a summons against Usher in the County Court under the County Court Amendment Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 108), ss. 50, 51, in which he demanded that he recovered judgment, and thereupon obtained possession of the premises under and by virtue of the warrant of the County Court. The plaintiff in the County Court action was in possession of the premises at the time as tenant to Usher, the defendant in these proceedings, but was no party to them in any way, and the present action was now brought by him against the defendant for retaining possession of the premises which he claimed to do under the County Court warrant above mentioned. The learned Baron, at the trial, was of opinion that the proceedings in the County Court and under the warrant had operated to change the legal possession, and that the present plaintiff Hudson was concluded thereby, and, therefore, he held that the present action of trespass was not maintainable by the plaintiff, whom he dismissed with costs. A rule having been subsequently obtained on his behalf to set that nonsuit aside, and for a new trial on the ground of misdirection in the learned Judge's so ruling.

May 22.—*Holker, Q.C. and Campbell Foster, for the plaintiff, showed cause against it; and Quain, Q.C. and Trevelyan, for the defendant, contra, supported it.*

THE COURT (Martin, Bramwell, and Pigott, B.B.) took time to consider its judgment, and now Jan. 22.—Their lordships delivered judgment *seriatim*, Channell and Pigott, B.B., being of opinion that the plaintiff's rule should be made absolute for a new trial; but Martin, B., retaining the opinion he entertained at the trial, thought it should be discharged.

Rule absolute.

Attorneys for the plaintiff, *Wetall and Roberts, Leadenhall-street.*
Attorneys for the defendant, *Messrs. Arnold and Moser, Ambleside.*
Attorney for the defendant, *H. S. Willett, 14, Gray's Inn-square, W.C., agent for R. F. Thompson.*

Monday, Jan. 22.

JOSSELYN v. PARSONS.

Action on bond—"Ale or porter merchant"—Brewer—Distinction—Construction.

THIS was an action to recover the penalty on a bond given by the defendant to the plaintiff under the circumstances hereinafter mentioned, and which was tried at the last summer assizes at Ipswich, before Pyles, J. The defendant, who was a brewer and a traveller to the plaintiff, who was an "ale, porter, or spirit merchant," at Colechester, had, upon entering into the plaintiff's service in that capacity, executed a bond to the plaintiff, by which he became bound to the plaintiff, and that he would not within twelve months after ceasing to be in the plaintiff's service travel for any "ale, porter, or spirit merchant" within twenty-five miles of Colechester. Having quitted the plaintiff's employment, the defendant immediately afterwards entered the service of a brewer at a distance of a few miles, and in that capacity he went about soliciting orders for the brewer within the distance limited by the bond, and thereupon the plaintiff brought this action to recover the penalty. The learned judge thought that a brewer, who only sold the goods which he had himself manufactured, did not come within the words of the bond as an "ale, porter, or spirit merchant," and that the bond was not, therefore, forfeited. A verdict, however, was entered for the plaintiff for nominal damages, and leave was reserved to the defendant to move to enter the verdict for him. A rule to that effect was accordingly subsequently obtained, and now

O'Malley, Q.C. (with him was Mayd) appeared to show cause against it, and

Bulwer, Q.C. and Graham, for the plaintiff, contra, supported it.

THE COURT (Martin, Bramwell, and Pigott, B.B.)

Martin, B. not without some doubt), made the rule absolute to enter the verdict for the defendant on the ground that a brewer who sells his own manufactures only was not a "merchant" in the common and ordinary sense of that term, and so did not come within the description in the bond, of an "ale, porter, or spirit merchant."

Rule absolute.

Attorneys for the plaintiff, *Jones, Colechester.*
Attorneys for the defendants, *Kingsford and Downes, 23, Essex-street, Strand.*
W.V.W. agents for *Turner, Deane, and Elves, Colechester.*

Saturday, Jan. 27.

JAMES v. THE SOUTH WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Count of Admiralty Jurisdiction by to stay action at common law—Prohibition by this court to stay proceedings upon such injunction.

THIS was a rule calling upon the London and South Western Railway Company to show cause why they should not be prohibited from further proceeding in a certain suit in the High Court of Admiralty called the *Normandy* to the injury of the plaintiff, and why they should not be prohibited from further proceeding to enforce or issue any injunction to restrain the said plaintiff from proceeding in a certain action in this court between the said plaintiff and the said defendants on the ground that such suit and proceedings are without the jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It appeared that the plaintiff on a day in May last took a ticket in London by the defendants' line of railway to Guernsey. Having arrived safely at Southampton, he proceeded on board one of the defendant's steamboats called the *Normandy* to go the remainder of his journey to Guernsey. Whilst on his voyage the vessel came into collision with a vessel called the *Mary*, whereby the *Normandy* was so much injured that she shortly sank, the passengers being saved, but all the goods including those of the plaintiff going down with her. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action against the defendants for the value of his goods. At the same time, the defendants brought an action in this court against the owners of the *Mary*, and the latter brought an action against the present defendants, each alleging the negligence of the other. The court of Admiralty ultimately held that it was the *Normandy* which was to blame. Upon that, the defendants instituted a suit in the Court of Admiralty, under the provisions of the 514th section of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104 (Merchant Shipping Act 1861), for limiting their liability, and the Court of Admiralty thereupon issued an injunction restraining the plaintiff from proceeding in his present action, and it was to set aside such injunction that the present rule was obtained.

Sir J. Kaye, Q.C. and W. G. Wood showed cause. Mr. Kaye, Q.C. and W. G. Harrison in support of the rule.

THE COURT were of opinion that the Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction to grant any such injunction, and made absolute the present rule.

Rule absolute.

Attorneys for the plaintiff, *Brookbank and Wolland.*

Attorneys for the defendants, *L. Crombie.*

COURT OF PROBATE.

Tuesday, Jan. 30.

(Before Lord PENANCE.)

In the Goods of SHEPHERD.

Inquest—Two of the next of kin abroad—Joint grant of adoptions nominated by them for the purpose refused—Practice.

JOHN SHEPHERD, late of Lynn, in the county of Chester, do. 16th Nov. 1871, intestate, was a bachelor, without any parent, brother or sister surviving him. His next of kin were John Shepherd Douglas, of Calcutta, Margaret Taylor Dew Douglas, and Elizabeth Hutton, of New York, his lawful nephew and nieces. Mr. Douglas had nominated Mr. T. S. Dods, of Manchester, his attorney, and Mrs. Hutton had nominated Mr. J. W. Stuart, of Manchester, to be her attorney, for the purpose of taking the grant of administration; and

Bulwer now moved that a joint grant of administration be made to these two gentlemen.

THE COURT held there was nothing in the circumstances of the case to take it out of the general rule, and refused to make a joint grant.

Proctor, Ayrton.

In the Goods of WILSON.

Last codicil—Evidence as to its being seen, but no evidence as to its execution—Probate refused.

THOMAS WILSON, late of Titchfield in the county of Hants, died leaving a will and six codicils, the last of which was executed shortly before his death, and merely contained an alteration in the names of the executors. The will and codicils were produced and read over at the funeral, and

were lent to a legatee who was executor under a previous codicil, to read. On their return the sixth codicil was found to be missing. An affidavit was read from a gentleman who had seen the codicil, and who deposed that it was in the handwriting of the deceased. It was signed by the testator and two other persons, but he could not remember whose the names were.

Indersick moved that a draft of the sixth codicil be admitted to probate along with the will and the other codicils.

THE COURT—the Court has never admitted to probate a document, as to the execution of which has been kind of a *quodammodo*. You may take probate of the will and the five codicils.

Attorneys: *Synopsis and Warner.*

In the Goods of PURSLOVE.

Will—The executor and residuary legatee signed the will after the testatrix and before attending witnesses—Probate granted.

MARY PURSLOVE, late of Birmingham, in the county of Warwick, died 20th Dec. 1870, left a will which was executed in the following form:

Mary Purslove x

Edward Valentine Smith, executor.

Witnesses, Henry Sermon, Daniel Mason.

E. B. Smith, who was also an attorney, legatee, died Jan. 2, 1871, without having proved the will, and

O. A. Middleton now moved that probate of the will and the *residuary legatee* be granted to David William Hind, the executor of E. V. Smith. He cited *In the Goods of Sherman* (38 L. J. 47, P. & M.: 39 L. J. 48, P. & M.: 38) as an authority, that Smith, by signing as executor, did not lose his interest.

THE COURT made the grant.

Attorneys, *Darton, Yeates, and Hart.*

In the Goods of J. N. LANOHAM.

Inquest—Next of kin minors—A stranger in blood elected guardian without citing one of the parent's next of kin who was resident abroad.

STEPHEN NAT LANOHAM, late of the Cambrian Stores, 12 Castle-street, in the county of Middlesex, licensed vintner, died Sept. 1, 1871, a widower, and intestate, leaving Alice and Elizabeth, his natural children, as his only next of kin. Both children were minors, being of the respective ages of 16 and 12 years. On the father's side there were no next of kin, and on the mother's side there were no next of kin, were two uncles and two aunts, of whom three had duly renounced their rights to the administration of the deceased's estate, and to the guardianship of the minors. The fourth, an uncle named Wm. Watson, had left this country in 1860 for the purpose of taking up his residence in the State of Nevada, in the United States. The court, on an inquiry, had been made to ascertain his present residence, and nothing was now known of him. The minors duly elected George Langham, a stranger in blood, to be their guardian for the purposes of administration to the estate of the deceased, and the court was now moved to make a grant of administration to him as guardian.

The value of the estate was about 100l.

Shearman, for the appellant, cited *In the Goods of Hagger* (3 Sw. & Tr. 67; 8 L. T. Rep. N. 8. 470).

In the Goods of Widger (3 Curt. 35). *In the Goods of Augustus J. Hay* (L. Rep. 1 P. & D. 57; 13 L. T. Rep. N. 835).

THE COURT—in this case there are several next of kin of the deceased who have had an opportunity of coming forward to represent them, and to say so find it necessary to do so. The only one who has been left out is residing abroad; and under these circumstances the court is inclined to say that the minors to elect a guardian as they have done. The rest follows as a matter of course.

Attorneys, *Allen and Son.*

ELECTION LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

ELECTION LAW—COUNTY—DESCRIPTION OF QUALIFIED ELECTORS—EXCLUDED VOTERS.

—RIGHT TO AMEND—Where the description of the property of a voter is erroneous, the revising barrister has power to amend under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 4.

—INCORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY—The claimant's qualification for a county vote was described as a "freehold house and garden," No. 4, English-street, Canterbury, his name had been so put on the register, the local authorities altered the number of this house to 9. There was another No. 4, English-street.

The claimant's vote was objected to, he was disallowed by the barrister, as he considered he had no power to amend. Held, that the barrister had power to amend. *Per Brett, J.*, that the barrister not only had power to amend, but he was bound to amend. *Bentley v. Watson*, 25 L. T. Rep. N. 8. 806. C. P.)

wealth v. The Dublin Trunk Lumber Company, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 776. (L. Chan.)

COMMONABLE RIGHTS — COMPENSATION. — Where the promoters acquire by conveyance from the lord of the manor, the right the soil of any lands subject to any rights of common, but no effectual meeting is held for the appointment of a committee of commoners, to agree with the promoters as to the amount of compensation for the extinguishment of their commonable rights, the promoters, and not the commoners, to take the initiative in getting a surveyor appointed by justices, to determine the amount of compensation. Where the promoters fail to do so, and act upon the land without payment or deposit of compensation to the commoners, whose rights of common are disturbed by the promoters, and who commonly may maintain an action against the promoters for the injury thereby sustained: (*Stonham v. The London, &c., South Coast Railway, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 788. Q. B.*)

MERCANTILE LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT — UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL — CONTRACT BY TELEGRAM — STATUTE OF FRAUDS. — Plaintiff having entered into a contract with one C., the brother of the defendant, for the sale of some hay, brought an action against defendant for not accepting the same. The judge at the trial admitted letters and telegrams signed by C. as evidence against the defendant, and the jury found for the plaintiff: Held, that there was sufficient evidence of the authority, and that the two telegrams, of which one was signed in C.'s name, and in the other the name of defendant was not mentioned as buyer, together constituted a sufficient memorandum of the contract to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, on the ground that defendant might be treated as the undisclosed principal of C., who appeared on the telegrams to be liable as principal: (*McBlaia v. Cross, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 804. C. P.*)

AUCTIONEER'S IMPLIED AUTHORITY — CLAIM OF LANDLORD — PASSING OF PROPERTY ON SALE. — Two partners authorised an auctioneer to sell the effects of the partnership, and to hold the proceeds as stakeholder. The judge at the trial directing him as to the disposition thereof. The sale took place under conditions, one of which was, "Each and all lots shall be taken to be delivered at the fall of the hammer, and the purchaser shall remain, and be at the exclusive risk of the purchaser, and the auctioneer shall not be called upon for compensation for injury or loss sustained after the time of sale. When the sale was over, but before the lots had been all removed, the landlord demanded rent from the auctioneer, who promised to pay it out of the proceeds of the sale, in order to avert the distress which the landlord threatened. Held, in an action by the partner, who was entitled, according to the joint direction of both of them, to the whole proceeds, against the stakeholder, that the property in the goods sold had passed to the purchasers at the time of the promise to pay the rent, and therefore the stakeholder was liable to the plaintiff for the amount he had so promised: (*Steeting, app. v. Turner, resp. 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 799. Q. B.*)

COUNTY COURTS.

CHESTER COUNTY COURT.

(Before J. W. HAIDEN, Esq., Judge.)

HARRISON v. BOOTH.

This was an action of a somewhat singular character. At the County Court held in April, Mr. Booth, who was then residing in Liverpool, sued Mr. Matthew Harrison on a I O U for 15s. odd, but a verdict was given for the defendant, one of the grounds of defence being that there had been a partnership between the two, in connection with which this I O U had been given. Mr. Harrison also pleaded a counter claim on another I O U of 10s. He now brought a suit in the County Court to recover the costs incurred in that action, about 11s., and also the 10s. in question.

Marshall, who (assisted by Mr. Massey) appeared for the defendant, contended that as to the costs no action would lie in the County Court. It was perfectly true that as a general doctrine, one law, an action would lie in one court upon the judgment of another court of competent jurisdiction; but even this would not apply except with many restrictions and qualifications. Thus an action would not lie on a decree in equity (*Carpenter v. Thornton*), nor from an inferior to a superior common law tribunal (*Emerson v. Lowry, 2 H. Bl. 1.*) nor upon a County Court judgment (*Berkley v. Eiderlin, 1 E. & B.*). The Petitioner Court had its own machinery for carrying its judgments into execution, but of this the plaintiff had omitted to avail

himself, by neglecting to take security for costs, under the last section of its rules, from Booth, who resided within its jurisdiction. The plaintiff now sought to atone for his own neglect by resorting to the process of another court, and so bringing action upon action, and needlessly increasing the costs of the defence. If he had informed himself of the remedies given him by the Petitioner Court, and they had proved defective, it might have been different, as in the case of a foreign court whose judgments it was difficult to enforce in England; but he had not done so. If an action would not lie on the judgment of a County Court in a Superior Court, it seemed anomalous if the opposite rule should be good; besides it was extremely doubtful whether the costs alone, as severed from the judgment, would be a good cause of action. That was emphatically denied in *Emerson v. Lowry*, where it was said that "in actions brought in the Superior Courts, the costs became a duty only by being united with the judgment; but as to the conduct of the interlocutory proceedings, they are fit to be regulated by the authority of the court where they arise."

His HONOUR said the point was rather a nice one, and he would reserve it. To the further claim of the plaintiff, on the I O U, the partnership was alleged as a defence. His HONOUR said he was inclined to think that was a private transaction, but he would enter a formal verdict for the plaintiff on both points, with leave of execution until he had delivered judgment.

CLITHEROE COUNTY COURT.

Wednesday, Jan. 24.

(Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q. C., Judge.)

HANSON v. GOSWOLD.
Animals ferre nature—Trovee—Bass or qualified property—Trovee for a ferret will not lie if session be lost and abandoned.

Dense for plaintiff.
Baldwin for defendant.
THIS action was in trover for a ferret belonging to the plaintiff, in the possession of the defendant. His HONOUR said that, on the 23rd April, 1871 (Sunday), the plaintiff was the owner of a ferret, and he and three companions were in certain enclosed grounds, and used the ferret for the purpose of catching rats, and the alleged rats being an article in considerable demand in Manchester and Liverpool for sporting purposes. The plaintiff, using the ferret, went into a hole in a bank, and they could not get it back, and at length left it. A few days afterwards a ferret was found at night straying in the plaintiff's lands in the occupation of one Hanson, at a considerable distance from the place where the plaintiff had lost his ferret. Hanson took possession of the ferret. There was no evidence upon it, and he did not know, nor had any reason to suppose it belonged to the plaintiff. The defendant was the gunkeeper of a person who had the right of sporting over the land in Hanson's occupation, and it was his duty to preserve the game and destroy vermin. Hanson gave him the ferret, and he took and has kept it ever since. On the 29th April, the plaintiff having been informed that the defendant had in his possession a ferret which had been found by Hanson, asked the defendant to show it to him, which he did. The plaintiff identified it as the one he had lost on the 23rd, and demanded it from the defendant, and he refused to give it up, insisting that he had a right to give it to whoever it had been the plaintiff's or not, of which he knew nothing. Evidence was given as to the identity of the ferret which satisfied the court.

Baldwin for defendant, insisted that a ferret, being an animal ferre nature, could not be the subject of larceny (Russ & Ry. C. 350.) There was no property in it, at all events after the possession was lost.
Dense for the plaintiff, insisted that ferrets, being saleable and articles of merchandise, were the subject of property, and trover would lie for them, and that property was not lost by loss of possession if they could be identified, and here the ferret was identified.

His HONOUR, referring to 2 Bl. Com. p. 292, observed, that the property in animals, ferre nature, is of a baser or qualified nature, and is not the property of a man than while they are confined in his keeping or actual possession; but if at any time they regain their natural liberty his property ceases, unless they have assumed the usual custom of returning, as hawks or pigeons, or deer chased out of a park.

His HONOUR said that if these stray without my knowledge, and do not return in the usual manner, it is then lawful for any stranger to take them. Applying the law thus laid down to the case before him, he was of opinion that when the plaintiff, on the 23rd April, lost his ferret and abandoned all pursuit of it, and left to go wherever and do whatever he pleased, he lost it, and was not responsible for any injury

it might do, and Hanson, when he found it, might lawfully kill, keep, or dispose of it. Thus at large on the head, under the law as to a valuable owner, it was as much vermin as a weasel or polecat; and in giving to the defendant, it became as much his property, while in his possession and kept and fed by him, as it was the property of the plaintiff while in his possession and kept and fed by him.

Judgment for the defendant.

COLTNE COUNTY COURT.

(Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q. C., Judge.)

Thursday, Jan. 18.

LORE v. HAIGH AND ANOTHER.

Prerogative note—Agricultural Mortgage—Loans v. Lancashire (2 Camp. 285), Chalmers v. Darby (14 M. & W. 344), applied.

Francis Hartley, Barrister, for plaintiff.

Novell, Barrister, for defendants.

THIS action was by payee against four persons as makers of a joint and several promissory note for £25, and interest at 5 per cent., payable on demand. The sum sought to be recovered was 13s. 5s. 4d. The plaintiff was the treasurer of a loan society; two of the payees were principals, and two were sureties, and the other two were named as principals. The note was for payment of the £25, and interest on demand, or until the whole principal be repaid. The money had been lent the terms of repayment made by certain monthly instalments, extending over a period of forty-eight months from the date of the note, with a penalty on default of paying for each monthly payment that was not duly paid made. These terms were contained in certain rules of the loan society. It was not a registered society, but it was the application of these rules to the note that the amount sought to be recovered was ascertained.

Novell, on behalf of the sureties, objected, first, that the agreement proposed to be proved raised the contract arising on the note, which was to pay on demand; whereas, according to that agreement, the principal money was not recoverable until the monthly instalments were paid, and in effect time was therefore given to the principal in violation of the contract for which the sureties were bound.

Hartley, in answer, stated he should prove that the sureties were aware of the terms on which the money was lent, and that they were bound to pay until the whole principal sum be repaid, had reference to the rules and the effect of them.

It was then objected on behalf of the sureties that the plaintiff did not know of the terms of the loan, the action must be considered as having been brought on the note and the rules together, and that the rules, as embodying an agreement, could not be received unless they were stamped as an agreement; and

His HONOUR, after considering the case, held, that the agreement was a necessary part of the plaintiff's case, and not being stamped the rules could not be received in evidence, and he must be nonsuited.

DONCASTER COUNTY COURT.

(Before J. C. HANNAH, Esq., Deputy Judge.)

DUKE v. SEXTON.

Friendly Society—Registration of rules—New trial.

Besechy, of Bedford, applied for a new trial in the case of Duke v. Sexton, heard at the last court, where judgment was given against Senior, as president of the Union Sick Gift Society, held at Asken.

Palmer was interpreted Mr. Besechy, saying that he objected to the application altogether, on the ground that immediately after the decision the last court the advocates appearing for the defendant applied for a new trial on the very ground that was going to be argued to-day (that the rules of the society were not registered), that Mr. HONOUR said he would not grant the new trial, having once refused to grant a new trial, he had no further power to entertain the case.

There was a warm discussion took place between Besechy and Palmer, the former wishing to make his application and the latter objecting.

His HONOUR at length said he should like to hear one more case, but he had a right to oppose the application, but Besechy replied that this must be at the proper time.

Besechy then made his application, quoting the case of *Smith v. Pryor*, and contending that where the rules of a society have not been enrolled (as in this case), and not certified, and in the meantime the society was doing its friendly society at all, and his Honour had no jurisdiction.

Palmer again opposed the application, quoting the case of the *Queen v. The City of London v. Mosely*, and saying in support of his argument.

His HONOUR said that the mistake had all arisen

for they must remember that some of the greatest principles of the law had been enunciated out of the most apparently trumpery cases. And it came before the judges. Unless they were diligent they would never know the law. The law did not permit half service; they must thoroughly study it from the top of the tree to the very roots, or they would never be so competent to advise the persons who must necessarily come to them. They must remember, too, that principles were of more importance than particular cases. A man might read a thousand cases and know nothing of the law, while another, who had read only half a dozen, and worked out the principles involved in those who had read more and studied less. It was certain that no cases presented precisely the same facts, and if a solicitor, on being consulted about a case, tried to find in his library the one that was nearest to it, he would be pursuing the wrong course. A wise and prudent man having got out all the facts, would apply to them the principles of law which were engrained in him, and would then be able to advise his client fairly, legitimately, and honestly. As students, and as members of the Profession, they could not be too diligent and punctual in attending to their duties if they wished to earn the confidence of the public. English chairmen concluded by enlarging upon the importance of the object for which these and other kindred societies of the Profession. He hoped that each member of this society would make that the object of his individual study. A great more was going on in London, by which the study of the law would be placed on a much better footing than it was at present. At present compulsory examination was confined to the lower branches, while for the barrister and advocate there was really no examination at all. He was certain that would not long exist, and whether or not a university would be established for both branches of the Profession he could not say, but it was evident that more would be made for the imparting of a more extensive knowledge of the law and its principles by all branches of the Profession, and that it would become greatly raised in the estimation of their neighbours.

Mr. Kynnersley proposed "The Attorneys and Solicitors of Birmingham," saying he should be ungrateful, after the kindness he had received during his connection with Birmingham, if he did not take the dearest possible interest in the members of that profession. He cordially sympathized with the wish of the Recorder that the courts would be so transplanted into a more genial region, as the present court in Moor-street was almost intolerable. Owing to the construction of the place, and the heat which was when it was crowded, it was one of the most abominable holes on the face of the earth; and when it was comparatively empty the echo was dreadful, and it was almost impossible to hear. Mr. G. J. Johnson, responding, said he thought that, with few exceptions, the attorneys of Birmingham would compare favourably with those of any other town in the country, and in England. He enlarged upon the importance of the students acquiring a thorough knowledge of the Profession, in enabling them to transact business efficiently to themselves and with satisfaction to their clients.

Mr. W. Johnson gave the "Birmingham Law Society," and Mr. C. T. Sander responded. Mr. Van Wart having read the balance-sheet, The Chairman proposed "Success to the Birmingham Law Students' Society," in which he expressed astonishment at the fact of its containing only forty members. He hoped that everyone in that room would do his best to add to that number, as he was assured that by rubbing their shoulders against the others they would rub off those asperities which some young men possessed, their ideas would be ventilated, contracted, thwarted, or supported, and they would be training for their future duties (applause).

Mr. Baker responded to the toast. A vote of thanks to the chairman, which he acknowledged, closed the proceedings. The scrutineers announced that the following had been elected on the committee—Honorary: Messrs. T. G. Lew, J. E. B. Clitherley, W. B. Rawlings, Ordinary: Messrs. W. Johnson, A. Canning, A. Van Wart, G. W. Stanbury, G. W. Hickman, and G. G. Horton.

LEGAL OBITUARY.

R. ST. G. MAYNE, ESQ.

The late Robert St. George Mayne, Esq., barrister-at-law, who died at his residence, 5, Belvidere-place, Dublin, on the 25th Dec., in the sixty-first year of his age, was the eldest son of the late Lord Southborough Mayne, Esq., formerly assistant barrister for the county of Cavan. He was born in the year 1810, and was called to the Irish Bar in Easter Term, 1837.

W. L. CUFFE, ESQ.

The late William L. Cuffe, Esq., barrister-at-law, who died at Florence, on an attack of diphtheria, on the 15th Jan., was the youngest son of the late T. L. Cuffe, Esq., of Kilfinn, King's County. He was called to the Bar by the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple in May 1822, and practised for many years at the Essex, Hertford, Chelmsford, and St. Alban's Assizes.

J. MASON, ESQ.

The late Joseph Mason, Esq., solicitor, of Waterloo, Liverpool, who died at the residence of his sister, Mrs. Simpson, at Dellowdale, Dumfriesshire, on the 22nd Dec., was born at Lincoln in the year 1795, and had consequently attained the age of seventy-six. He was the father of the legal profession in Liverpool, where he had carried on a respectable and extensive practice for upwards of half a century. He was admitted a solicitor in Hilary Term 1818, and the following year settled in Liverpool, where his long and honourable career terminated, at his late residence, at the age of seventy-six. He was the father of a numerous body of clients. Mr. Mason at one time took an active part in municipal matters, and was the representative of St. Anne's Ward, Liverpool, of which he was long a resident. He was also clerk of the local board of Waterloo, but relinquished the post through the infirmity of age. He was a gentleman, whose loss will be felt by a large circle of friends and acquaintances, lived and died unmarried. His remains were interred at Holywood, Dumfriesshire.

PROMOTIONS & APPOINTMENTS.

(N.B.—Announcements of promotions being in the nature of advertisements, are charged 2s. 6d. each, for which postage stamps should be included.)

The Lord High Chancellor has appointed Mr. W. W. Gwillim and Mr. H. E. Paine, of Chertsey, Surrey, Commissioners to administer oaths in Chertsey and Egham.

The Right Hon. Sir William Bovill, Knight, Lord Chief Justice of Her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas, has appointed Mr. W. W. Gwillim and Mr. H. E. Paine, of Chertsey, Surrey, to be Perpetual Commissioners for taking the acknowledgment of Deeds to be executed by married Women under Acts passed for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries, and for the substitution of more simple Modes of Assurance.

THE COURTS & COURT PAPERS.

THE SPRING CIRCUITS.

The following is a complete and revised list of the Spring Circuits of the Judges:—

HOME.
(The Lord Chief Justice of England and Lord Chief Justice BOWLL.)
Hertford, March 4 Lewes, March 18
Chelmsford, March 7 Kingston, March 25
Maidstone, March 11

WESTERN.
(Baron MARTIN and Baron BRAMWELL.)
Devizes, Feb. 25 Bournemouth, March 11
Winchester, March 2 London, March 22
Exeter, March 8 Bristol, March 28
Dorchester, March 12

NORFOLK.
(Lord Chief Baron KELLY and Mr. Justice BLACKBURN.)
Oakham, Feb. 25 Huntingdon, March 11
Leicester, Feb. 29 Cambridge, March 16
Northampton, March 4 Norwich, March 27
Aylesbury, March 11 Ipswich, March 27
Bedford, March 11

OXFORD.
(Mr. Justice BYLES and Mr. Justice CLARKE.)
Reading, Feb. 25 Shrewsbury, March 18
Oxford, Feb. 29 Hereford, March 25
Windsor, March 2 Gloucester, March 30
March 5 Gloucester (and City)
Stafford, March 11 Bristol 4

MIDLAND.
(Mr. Justice KEATINGE and Mr. Justice QUINN.)
Warwick, Feb. 24 Lincoln, March 11
Leicester, Feb. 29 York, March 18
Nottingham, March 6 Leeds, March 25

NORTH-WEST.
(Mr. Justice MILLER and Mr. Justice LEACH.)
Apley, Feb. 16 Lancaster, March 7
Carlisle, Feb. 29 Manchester, March 11
Newcastle, Feb. 24 Liverpool, March 22
Durham, Feb. 29

NORTH WALES.
(Baron CHAMBERLAIN.)
Welsby, March 11 Ruthin, March 23
Mold, March 15 Chester, March 30
Carmarvon, March 19

SOUTH WALES.
(Mr. Justice GREGG.)
Haverfordwest, Feb. 29 Brecon, March 22
Cardiff, Feb. 29 Prestegyn, March 22
Carmarthen, March 9 Chester, March 30
Swansea, March 9

Mr. Justice WILLIAMS remains in town.

THE GAZETTES.

Professional Partnership Dissolved.

MARSH, ROBERT, and EDWARDS, FREDERICK, attorneys and solicitors, Rotherham and Sheffield. Dec. 31.

Bankruptcy.

Genlle, Jan. 25.

To surrender at the Bankruptcy Court, Basinghall-street.
DENT, STEPHEN, brass founder, Curran-st. Rotherhithe. Feb. 2. Sur. Feb. 9.
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Genlle, Jan. 25.

To surrender at the Bankruptcy Court, Basinghall-street.
EDSON, FRANK, baker, High-st. Stratford. Feb. 21. Sur. Feb. 28.
MURPHY, FRANK, baker, High-st. Stratford. Feb. 21. Sur. Feb. 28.
GATES, GEORGE, baker, High-st. Stratford. Feb. 21. Sur. Feb. 28.
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